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INVESTIGATING INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY CHARACTERISTICS: DO 
QUALITY, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE REDUCE ORGANIZATIONAL 
FRAUD? 
By 
Dennis T. Brown 
 
Organizational fraud, a deceitful practice or willful device resorted to with intent 
to deprive another of his right, or in some manner to do harm or injury, is a growing 
global concern. While cyberattacks from the outside are more expected, the internal 
security threat from trusted insiders is responsible for significantly more information 
compromise than external threats. Information systems make life easier but are 
increasingly used by employees to perpetrate fraudulent activities. For example, a trusted 
insider employee with access to sensitive customer databases could misappropriate 
information and sell it to a competitor for personal gain. These type losses are typical of 
organizational fraud averaging 5% of annual revenues, and current detection and 
prevention methods are not fully adequate to address the threat.  
This research examines how organizational fraud is affected by information 
security policy characteristics. We specifically study the effects of quality and 
enforcement as mediated by security compliance using a sampling of survey data from 
selected organizations. Our results show that increased quality and enforcement supports 





organizational fraud. Additionally, our model demonstrates that compliance fully 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Organizational fraud reduces every organization’s ability to reach its full 
potential. It is a major insidious risk facing businesses and is increasingly difficult to 
detect and prevent (Abbasi, Albrecht, Vance, & Hansen, 2012; Cressey, 1986; Wolfe & 
Hermanson, 2004). Fraud is a latent crime; its true, complete impact is difficult to 
measure accurately (Button, Lewis, Shepherd, & Brooks, 2015; Davis & Pesch, 2013). 
Fraud affects society to such a degree that it has effectively reduced overall consumer and 
investor confidence in core business processes (Albrecht, Albrecht, & Albrecht, 2008). 
Computers make handling, storage and manipulation of large amounts of data much 
easier but have also introduced greater opportunity for organizational fraud. Wider use of 
information systems has opened the door to opportunistic, self-serving behavior, 
including fraud. Information security policy violations result in a “superhighway” to 
various organizational fraud activities (Trinkle, Crossler, & Warkentin, 2014; Willison & 
Warkentin, 2013). The purpose of this research is to examine how organizational fraud is 
affected by information security policy characteristics of quality, enforcement, and 
compliance. Significant variance has been explained in previous individual studies to 
predict compliance, but not in the context of fraud research. We specifically study the 
effects of quality and enforcement as mediated by security compliance using a sampling 
of survey data from selected individuals. A review of 29 quantitative studies revealed 61 
antecedent variables that determine information security policy compliance. Since there 





variation, we chose to narrow the focus to those that potentially explain relatively 
more, especially those with a hypothesized interaction effect (policy quality and 
enforcement). Also, many of the studies using other variables present either conflicting 
results or a wide statistical range of similar results. For example, the predictor variable 
“subjective norm” ranged from a β = -0.09 to 0.45 (Sommestad, Hallberg, Lundholm, & 
Bengtsson, 2014). We chose to use the independent variables of policy quality and 
enforcement because policy quality coupled with robust enforcement are variables that 
directly impact the human aspect of the insider threat, which is generally considered more 
dangerous and potentially harmful than attacks from outside sources. Trusted individuals 
working inside organizations continue to be the weakest link when assessing overall 
security risk (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010b; Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 
2012; M. Siponen & Willison, 2009). Several elements of enforcement, including 
perceived behavioral control, perceived justice of punishment, threat appraisal, and the 
threat of sanctions (certainty, celerity, and severity) most significantly predicted 
compliance (Sommestad et al., 2014). The following sections focus on organizational 
fraud and the theoretical relationships between each of the specified information security 
policy characteristics (quality, enforcement, and compliance) included in this research 
study. 
Organizational Fraud 
Organizational fraud is defined here as “some deceitful practice or willful device, 
resorted to with intent to deprive another of his right, or in some manner to do him an 





2009). This is consistent with the accounting and auditing community definition set forth 
in the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 99 (T. D. Carpenter, 2007).  
Most of the current fraud detection/prevention models focus on financial 
measures (generally 6-10) and ratios, which work to identify and disclose certain “red 
flags” or other indicators of potential fraud (Abbasi et al., 2012). Our model differs 
significantly since we focus on antecedents that impact actions of the trusted insiders in 
general before they have a chance to act. These trusted insiders generally have the ability 
to inflict the most harm acting from within the organization.  
There are several different types of fraud schemes discussed in the literature. 
Asset misappropriation is one such example in which a perpetrator steals, abuses or 
otherwise misuse the employing organization’s resources. An example of these resources 
is the customer database, which contains sensitive, proprietary information critical to 
successful operations of the business. Customer databases are among many 
organizations’ most valuable non-monetary assets and are a significant target of insider 
fraud attempts. Professional data collected and retained for business purposes poses a 
threat due to its very existence (Rechtman & Rashbaum, 2015). As data volume grows, 
organizations are increasingly targets for unauthorized use (Rechtman & Rashbaum, 
2015). For example, trusted insiders may feel emboldened to violate existing security 
policies to steal valuable database information and use it for personal gain (DeZoort & 
Harrison, 2016).  
Although external audits are a popular fraud tool, they are empirically among the 
least effective (ACFE, 2016). Despite changes to basic accounting and internal control 





continues to worsen (Abbasi et al., 2012). Only a small portion of white-collar crimes and 
misdemeanors are discovered, including computer-related employee fraud in the 
workplace (Lowe, Pope, & Samuels, 2015; Straub Jr & Nance, 1990).  
Information Security Policy Compliance 
Extant research has not studied potential synergistic effects of policy quality and 
enforcement thus far. Since the main threat to information security originates with trusted 
employees’ non-compliance with security policies, we searched for independent variables 
that theoretically explain more of the reasons for this lack of compliance (M. Siponen, 
Mahmood, & Pahnila, 2014). Non-compliance of information security policy and weak 
internal controls may be linked to fraudulent activity of various types (Lynch & Gomaa, 
2003; Richardson & Director, 2008). Lack of policy compliance is a recognized 
weakness in most organizations and is increasingly becoming a management and 
leadership priority (Bulgurcu et al., 2010b; Coopers, 2014; Vance, Lowry, & Eggett, 
2015). According to Whitman (2003), human failures and insufficient security policies 
ranked number three and four respectively among information security threats in order of 
severity (Whitman, 2003). Insider employees that leave the organization become a 
special threat; 59% admit to stealing privileged client information such as customer 
contact lists, employee records, and various forms of non-financial data contact lists 
(Ayyagari, 2012).  
Information Security Policy Quality 
Information security policy quality is the perceived level of adequacy and 
completeness of the guidelines that cover all information risk possibilities in an 





Deterrence Theory (GDT) theoretically link information security policy quality and 
enforcement to information security policy compliance (Goo et al., 2014); however, any 
potential relationship between information security policy quality leading to compliance 
and fraud has not been studied.  
The insider threat is generally considered to have more harmful potential than 
attacks from outside sources (Bulgurcu et al., 2010b; Chen et al., 2012; M. Siponen & 
Willison, 2009). Fraud is more difficult to accomplish from the outside since the 
perpetrator does not know where the information resides and has to search through large 
amounts of data. Research indicates that security policies focusing on the insider versus 
external threats are more successful in preventing information losses (Posey, Roberts, 
Lowry, Bennett, & Courtney, 2013). Fraud surveys find that 51% of those responding 
have no plan in place to deal with insider threats despite the upward trend. Many 
companies still do not have a formal information systems threat security function and 
simply let the IT section handle issues (Coopers, 2014). Since computers and large 
volumes of data contained in information systems are common to most industries, many 
opportunities for fraud and other malicious activity are increasingly available to potential 
perpetrators (Lynch & Gomaa, 2003; Purda & Skillicorn, 2015).  
Higher information quality contained in the information  security policy positively 
affects end-user information security policy compliance (Abedin, Nessa, Al-Shaer, & 
Khan, 2006; Bulgurcu et al., 2010b). Effective policy forms the underlying basis for all 
subsequent security efforts, including security culture and enforcement (Chen et al., 
2012; Lindup, 1995; M. Siponen & Vance, 2010). Employees must understand clearly the 





sensitive and proprietary data and subsequent file transfers offer multiple opportunities to 
engage in fraud. Policy that limits employee access through internal controls removes the 
basic opportunity to commit fraud. Limiting the number of authorized users essentially 
reduces the potential for malevolent behaviors leading to fraud. (Lynch & Gomaa, 2003; 
Roden, Cox, & Kim, 2016; Tabuena, 2013). 
Many potential fraud events originate simply with an individual’s ability to 
download sensitive information with little perceived monitoring or accountability 
(opportunity). Weak institutional and/or individual pressure to comply with established 
policy (lack of deterrence) results in perceived fraud opportunity. Higher quality 
information security policies inhibit potentially malevolent activities. Quality information 
security policies are designed to prohibit the unauthorized download of sensitive and 
valuable proprietary information, including company trade secrets and intellectual 
property. Higher quality security policies minimize the number of vetted employees 
granted access to highly sensitive information based on a bona-fide job requirement and 
“need-to-know”. Often this first line of defense is enough to prevent the opportunity to 
commit fraud and serves as a preemptive deterrent. Effective security monitoring and 
other forms of enforcement may create an environment where employees perceive they 
lack the opportunity to perpetrate fraud without discovery and subsequent sanctions.  
Organizational fraud concealment often involves manipulation of account values 
to set up later theft of assets (Ngai, Hu, Wong, Chen, & Sun, 2011; Steinbart, Raschke, 
Gal, & Dilla, 2015). If internal security controls are weak or not enforced in the 





while remaining anonymous. This is especially true if there is a lack of strong 
enforcement processes in place.   
Information Security Policy Enforcement 
Most violations are not caught by existing functional security risk management 
(SRM) programs but instead are discovered by accident or though whistleblowers. 
Information and tips from conscientious employees who witness fraud incidental to their 
job performance are leading sources of initial fraud discovery in organizations (ACFE, 
2016). This represents a low enforcement environment and indicates that other 
established processes to detect fraud have failed (Cecchini, Aytug, Koehler, & Pathak, 
2010). If security policies are implemented effectively, most potential breaches will be 
detected by a simple logging of violations tied to the fraudster. Employee attitudes 
toward fraud and incident reporting form over time based on perceived and empirical 
reinforcement in the workplace. Research indicates that only about 50% of employees 
overall are willing to report potential acts of fraud (Kaplan, Pope, & Samuels, 2015). 
These numbers could be significantly improved with increased policy quality and 
enforcement (Goo et al., 2014; Liu, Wright, & Wu, 2015). 
Many of the accounting and behavioral “Red Flags” associated with fraud are 
linked to information security and policy compliance (G. M. Trompeter, Carpenter, 
Jones, & Riley Jr, 2014). However, these policy violations and their possible specific 
links to organizational fraud have not been studied significantly and require further 
research (Tabuena, 2013).   
Examples of typical policy violations include gambling, online social networks 





schemes, chain-letter e-mails, sports contests, jokes, lottery pools, cyber bullying, and 
cyber stalking. Minimally these violations are considered pervasive forms of fraud and 
result in lost employee productivity during work hours. These violations are also a 
gateway to many more serious forms of potential fraud. Fraud could be significantly 
reduced if employees would strictly adhere to official information security policies 
(Trinkle et al., 2014; Warkentin & Willison, 2009). Organizational fraud in our study 
focuses on data theft because of the ubiquitous nature of data in today’s “information 
age”. 
Organizations are concerned with the cost of security compromises, public image, 
and increases in the volume of proprietary information requiring protection. Information 
security developments offer the potential for significant inroads toward fraud reduction in 
the future (Bulgurcu et al., 2010b; M. Siponen et al., 2014; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). 
Empirical research data linking fraud theory to fraud in a corporate environment is sparse 
(Roden et al., 2016). Traditional studies of financial ratios to identify potential fraud have 
demonstrated limited potential. We predicted that increased quality and enforcement 
would result in synergistic compliance, thereby achieving the lowest level of fraud, which 
was supported. Practitioners will benefit from empirical evidence that industry 
investment in higher quality policy and enforcement increases compliance and reduces 
perceived fraud.  
Therefore, we propose following research question (RQ):   






The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 covers existing 
fraud and information security policy compliance literature and proposes hypotheses to 
test the model. It also reviews previous efforts to identify and prevent financial fraud and 
demonstrates the need for more effective and robust methods. Chapter 3 discusses the 
methods used, study participants and setting, data analysis procedure and risks.   
The subsequent sections discuss the findings, research limitations, and 




















CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Literature Review 
Many reasons for organizational fraud are discussed in the literature, including 
employee motivations, accessibility, organizational ethical climate, incentive, 
opportunity, rationalization, and others (Ahmad & Norhashim, 2008; Albrecht, Howe, & 
Romney, 1984; Lynch & Gomaa, 2003; G. M. Trompeter et al., 2014). Many of these 
antecedents are included in our independent variables (policy quality and enforcement). 
Weak governance, lax audit controls, and inconsistent oversight all create perceived 
opportunities for fraudsters to act and subsequently avoid detection and punishment 
(Hafer & Gresham, 2012). The underlying basic concept of information security is that a 
satisfactory policy coupled with adequate enforcement will result in an increased and 
satisfactory level of security in the organization (Sommestad, Hallberg, Lundholm, & 
Bengtsson, 2014). Of the many variables introduced from years of study, enforcement 
and policy quality were ranked as the most significant with the potential to explain more 
of what past research failed to accomplish. Our objective for this research is to make a 
unique contribution to the field of fraud identification and prevention by studying 
antecedents that relate to the trusted human insider facet of policy compliance. Here we 
narrow down the factors that will most explain policy enforcement. We study policy 
characteristics and their relationship to fraud that potentially explain the most variance 






Cressey (Cressey, 1950, 1953) first studied fraud as a white-collar crime in the 
modern era. Systematic causation was theorized to determine and predict “the criminal 
violation of financial trust” among otherwise honorable employees and citizens (Cressey, 
1950)(Cressey, 1950, p.740).  Opportunity, incentive, and attitudes are key determinants 
regarding individual propensity to commit fraudulent activity (Cressey, 1950, 1953, 
1986; Sitorus & Scott, 2009).  
Over the years, growth of computer use and the ubiquitous nature of information 
databases increased the potential for more fraud opportunity. Congress passed the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) in 1994 to prevent fraud using unauthorized 
access to computers and associated data. The Act’s continued relevance is highlighted by 
the fact that it has been amended and strengthened several times over the years. The first 
amendment was 1994, again in 1996, then in 2002 following the events of 9/11 as part of 
the USA Patriot Act. It was further updated in 2008 by the Identity Theft Enforcement 
and Restitution Act. There is widespread disagreement between appellate courts 
regarding the reach and limitations of the law, but so far all have been consistent in 
application of the law regarding cases of intent to engage in fraudulent activities to obtain 
anything of value (Thomason, 2013).  
Congress also recognized the need and passed other key legislation designed to 
strengthen security of information collected and stored by organizations. This served to 
increase the awareness of top management and to increase their liability going forward. 
Chief among these was the Gramm-Leach-Billey Act or Financial Modernization Act of 
1999 (GLBA), which was designed to regulate how financial institutions handle, store 





designed to regulate the collection and dissemination of individuals’ private financial 
information. It also mandates that financial institutions must develop and implement 
information security programs to protect private information.  
Opportunity is a key antecedent of fraud, and is theoretically more available to 
trusted insiders (M. Siponen et al., 2014). Tenured employees occupying key positions 
within organizations are trusted with greater access to a wider range and depth of 
information, which also gives them commensurate opportunity to perform potentially 
fraudulent activity (Albrecht et al., 2008; Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004). Long-term 
employees and other trusted agents within the organization are often in positions to most 
clearly understand and exploit existing security vulnerabilities using their authority 
(Willison & Siponen, 2009). Information systems internal controls are designed to 
prevent this self-serving, opportunistic behavior (Steinbart et al., 2015; Wolfe & 
Hermanson, 2004). Many of them also develop the potential for nefarious individual gain 
during years of observation and performance of their jobs. Opportunistic behavior is 
increasingly likely when employees with significant capabilities and privileges are 
allowed to operate without an effective and operational information security policy 
(internal controls) in place (Albrecht, Wernz, & Williams, 1995; Wang, Gupta, & Rao, 
2015).  
Numerous methods of fraud detection and prevention have been studied to 
address increasing trends of organizational fraud; current approaches and potential 
solutions to fraud detection and prevention continue to fall short of expectations. (Abbasi 
et al., 2012; Lynch & Gomaa, 2003). These methods include expanded traditional audits 





data visualization, meta-learning frameworks, data mining, and the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (Abbasi et al., 2012; Debreceny & Gray, 2010; Dilla & Raschke, 2015; 
Ravisankar, Ravi, Rao, & Bose, 2011; G. Trompeter & Wright, 2010). More innovative, 
robust and improved methods are required to stem rising losses (Abbasi et al., 2012; 
Holton, 2009). Fraud cases average 18 months from execution to discovery, which 
highlights the insidious nature of the problem (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 
2016). Most violations are not caught by existing functional security risk management 
(SRM) programs but instead are discovered by accident or though whistleblowers, 
thereby indicating weak enforcement (Cecchini et al., 2010; Straub Jr & Nance, 1990). 
Information and tips from conscientious employees who witness fraud incidental to their 
job performance are leading sources of initial fraud discovery in organizations (ACFE, 
2016). Employee attitudes toward fraud and incident reporting form over time based on 
perceived and empirical reinforcement in the workplace. Research indicates that only 
about 50% of employees overall are willing to report potential acts of fraud (Kaplan et 
al., 2015).  
Information Security Policy Quality 
Information security policy quality is the perceived level of adequacy and 
completeness of the guidelines that cover all information risk possibilities in an 
organization (Chen et al., 2012; Goo et al., 2014). Policy is a comprehensive collection of 
rules, directives, and accepted practices that establish how an organization is to manage, 
protect and distribute important, sensitive information (Swanson, Hash, & Bowen, 2006). 
Information security policy design and implementation are important and poor quality 





2003). Top management involvement in policy formulation has a positive impact on 
information security effectiveness, and management practices have a significant role in 
information technology system effectiveness (Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2015; 
Soomro, Shah, & Ahmed, 2016). Policy provides guidance and direction to systems users 
and employees by specifically defining acceptable and unacceptable use of the 
organization’s information systems and controlled information (Ashenden, 2008; 
Flowerday & Tuyikeze, 2016).  
Security policy is the foundation and arguably the most important security layer 
available to organizations; it defines the security philosophy of the organization and is the 
basis for future security decisions and priorities. It is also an indicator of the degree to 
which the organization takes information security seriously (D'Arcy, Herath, & Shoss, 
2014; M. T. Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007; Whitman, 2003). These policies are the 
subject of discussion, study, and disagreement regarding the content as they vary 
significantly among organizations (Ølnes, 1994; Rees, Bandyopadhyay, & Spafford, 
2003; Whitman, 2004; Wood, 1995).  
Information security policy continues to evolve in order to meet emerging threats 
(K. Höne & J. Eloff, 2002; K. Höne & J. H. P. Eloff, 2002; Lichtenstein, 1997; Ølnes, 
1994; Rees et al., 2003; Wood, 1995). The most commonly used and accepted industry 
guidelines are listed in Table 1. International information security standards originated to 
promulgate “best practices” among quality organizations in order to ensure the proper 
safeguarding of information in organizations (Susanto, Almunawar, & Tuan, 2012). 
These standards are primarily technical in nature but should form the foundation for 





al., 2012). Organizational policies must be individually tailored and strategically aligned 
for consistency with the specific organizational goals and operating procedures of each 
(Baskerville & Siponen, 2002; Neil F Doherty & Fulford, 2006; Vroom & Von Solms, 
2004). These key benchmarks allow organizations to measure their programs and policies 
against industry standards, but they must still be modified for organizational and industry 
variations (Susanto, Almunawar, Tuan, Aksoy, & Syam, 2011).  
Table 1 
Information Security Policy Quality Standards  
Information Security Policy Quality Studies/Reference 
1. Industry Standards Factor Price, Waterhouse, & Coopers, (2016) 
2. ISO 27001/27002 International Standards Organization 
(ISO), (2013).  
3. Control Objectives for 
Information and Related 
Technology (COBIT) 5  
ISACA, 2016 
4. Cybersecurity Framework U.S. National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), 2016. 
5. British Standard 7799-3 British Standard Institution (BSI), 
1995, 1998 
6. Critical Security Controls 
(SANS Top 20) version 6.0 
SANS Institute, Council on 
Cybersecurity (2013). 
7. Information Technology 
Infrastructure Library (ITIL) 
British Standard Institution (BSI), 
2011. 
8. Payment Card Industry Data 
Security Standard (PCIDSS) 
v.3.2 
Payment Card Industry Security 
Standards Council, 2016. 
Acceptable use policy (AUP) standards are critical to quality information security 





workplace privileges and limitations in order to achieve compliance. It is impossible to 
enforce standards if they are not quantified and codified (Neil Francis Doherty, 
Anastasakis, & Fulford, 2011; Räisänen, 2013; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Acceptable 
use policy effectively reduces the opportunity of trusted insiders to be successful in 
opportunistic and self-serving behavior. Acceptable use policy includes the seven 
components contained in Table 2 (Neil Francis Doherty et al., 2011). For example, some 
companies allow employees to pay bills from work and do other tasks not related to their 
job within prescribed parameters during designated breaks. The exact same activity may 
be strictly prohibited in other companies. Acceptable use policies serve as deterrence to 
potential unauthorized behavior leading up to fraud. For example, if a policy prohibits 
downloading sensitive proprietary information (such as customer information), then a 
violation should immediately trigger a violation warning assuming that system 
monitoring and electronic logging is functioning. By setting the boundaries for 
employees, quality acceptable use policy affects employee attitudes as they consider 
malicious activity and potential punishments for offending behavior (Bridges & Stone, 
1986).  
Policy must be written, communicated, enforced and institutionalized in order to 
be effective (Kadam, 2007; Rees et al., 2003; Wood, 1995). Employees must initially and 
periodically sign various instruments indicating their understanding and willingness to 
comply with the established policy (enforcement). They must also understand that 
progressive disciplinary action and/or sanctions for potential policy violations will be 
levied quickly and surely. Recurrent employee refresher, acknowledgement and 





toward compliance and their expectations regarding future performance. It also ensures 
that everyone, from the top down, is adhering to the same standards (Neil Francis 
Doherty et al., 2011). 
Table 2 
Seven Components of Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) 
Components 
1. Continuous monitoring of proprietary organizational assets with 
activity logging. 
2. Establishing a standard of “no privacy” expectations among employees 
(complete opposite of anonymity). 
3. Clear definition of boundaries regarding improper employee use of 
computing assets. 
4. Allowable employee uses and activities of computing assets. 
5. Protection and security of sensitive company information. 
6. Disciplinary action and sanctions for potential policy violations and 
disclosure. 
7. Written employee acknowledgement and understanding of the policy 
 
Asset misappropriations are the most common form of fraud, occurring in 85% of 
ACFE studies. Asset misappropriations are defined as fraud schemes where the 
perpetrator steals, abuses or otherwise misuse the employing organization’s resources. 
Common asset misappropriations include theft of company cash, valuables, or other non-
cash items, false billing schemes, and false or inflated expense reports (ACFE, 2016).  
The top three most important contributing factors to fraud are 1) lack of internal 
controls; 2) lack of management review; and 3) override of existing internal controls 





systems literature which asserts that the most pressing threat to organizations is from 
trusted insiders (Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen, 2015; Richardson & Director, 2008; G. 
M. Trompeter, Carpenter, Desai, Jones, & Riley Jr, 2012). Many of the most expensive 
and damaging information security breaches have been from trusted managerial and 
supervisory officials who by virtue of their duty position are exempt from adequate 
scrutiny (Chen et al., 2012; Vance, Lowry, & Eggett, 2013). Since only a small fraction 
of employees who discover fraud actually report it, other tools and controls must be 
employed to ensure effective enforcement in organizations (Kaplan et al., 2015; Straub Jr 
& Nance, 1990).  
Information Security Policy Enforcement 
Information security policy enforcement is the perceived level of supervisory 
oversight, monitoring, and organizational emphasis placed on information security with 
the goal of compliance (Goo et al., 2014). Organizational internal controls (policies and 
monitoring) increase the level of compliance and reduce the incidence of employee 
deviance, of which fraud is a key outcome (Dorminey, Fleming, Kranacher, & Riley Jr, 
2012; Hollinger & Clark, 1982). Effective information security policy enforcement is the 
result of many factors, including human, physical and technological (Boss, Kirsch, 
Angermeier, Shingler, & Boss, 2009; Shropshire, Warkentin, & Sharma, 2015). Effective 
enforcement requires employees to perceive that their supervisors monitor and care about 
following established policies. It also requires that supervisors incorporate compliance 
into overall performance assessments (Goo et al., 2014; Johnston et al., 2015). A 
significant number of breaches could be prevented if victim organizations had simply 





Continuous monitoring of proprietary organizational assets is the most effective 
when it is routine and standardized. All end-users should understand that every action on 
the system is monitored, logged and retrievable for future use by management if 
necessary for administrative and/or punitive actions; this establishes a degree of 
accountability and eliminates the perception of anonymity. Previous research indicates 
that anonymity is an inducement for potential perpetrators to engage in fraud since it 
allows them to avoid identification (Vance et al., 2013). All employees should understand 
that they have no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding any use of a company-
provided information technology system.  
Internal control systems are designed to reduce employee and managers’ 
opportunity to carry out opportunistic and self-interested behavior (PCAOB, 2016). The 
strength of these internal controls is a key factor regarding the efficacy of preventing the 
undesired behavior (Tayler & Bloomfield, 2011). Policy quality and enforcement 
determine the strength of internal information security controls leading to less 
opportunity for potential fraudsters (Liu et al., 2015; Steinbart et al., 2015). Liu et al. 
(2015) performed research regarding links between the strength of internal controls and 
fraud. They found a significant correlation between weak monitoring and increased fraud 
levels. As strength of monitoring decreases, organizational fraud levels increase (Liu et 






Information Security Policy Compliance 
 Information security policy compliance is the degree to which employees intend 
to comply with the rules set forth in the specific policy established by the company (Goo 
et al., 2014). The main threat to information security originates with employee non-
compliance with information security policies (M. Siponen et al., 2014). Compliance 
with individual and organizational information security policies protects information 
assets from various forms of malfeasance, many of which are antecedents to fraud. 
Information assets are exploited for personal gain and are the object of various forms of 
fraudulent activity (Lynch & Gomaa, 2003).  
Individuals make security compliance decisions based on many factors, including 
perceptions, beliefs, and biases (Chen et al., 2015; Q. Hu, West, & Smarandescu, 2015; 
Tsohou, Karyda, Kokolakis, & Kiountouzis, 2015). Both negative and positive incentives 
have been suggested and tested empirically to increase employee compliance with 
established information security policy (Bulgurcu et al., 2010b; Chen et al., 2012; 
D'Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009a, 2009b). These incentives, 
coupled with the perceived certainty, celerity and severity of sanctions to influence 
employee behavior, have been extensively studied in the literature (Straub & Welke, 
1998; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). However, the research findings do not indicate 
strong support for these incentives as significantly affecting behavior, and do not always 
agree (Chen et al., 2012).  Findings also included a strong relationship between 
information security policy, social controls and security culture, which suggests that 
policy quality and enforcement are key attributes in achieving overall compliance with 





Ifinedo, 2014). We reviewed many potential independent variables that explain smaller 
amounts of the overall variance, many of which are antecedents comprising policy 
quality and enforcement. For example, perceived risk of shame, perceived security risk, 
security culture, and numerous others explained small amounts of variance. Our focus 
here is to explain relatively more variance. Many past studies using other variables 
produced varying and sometimes inconsistent results. We use policy quality and 
enforcement because policy quality coupled with robust enforcement are variables that 
directly impact the human aspect of the insider threat, which is generally considered more 
dangerous and potentially harmful than attacks from outside sources. 
Studies indicate that the perceived severity of information security threats resulted 
in more behavioral intention to comply with information security policies (M. Siponen et 
al., 2014). For example, as the perceived severity of the threat to the company increases, 
so does the employees’ intention to comply. Employee belief as to whether they have the 
ability to apply and adhere to information security policies (technical ability etc.) was 
another significant factor. Similarly, employees’ perceived vulnerability to potential 
security threats, their attitude toward complying with information security policies, and 
organizational management modeling regarding compliance also affected intention to 
comply (M. Siponen et al., 2014). Employee intention to comply with information 
security policy is significantly influenced by attitude, normative beliefs, and self-efficacy 
to comply (Chen et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2015). Outcome beliefs significantly affect 
attitudes regarding overall assessment of consequences, which in turn significantly 
affects employee attitudes (Chen et al., 2012). Information security awareness positively 





Recent research indicates that information system access policy violations result 
in increased organizational fraud and theft. Although most information security policies 
limit the use of computing systems strictly for company business, non-compliance by 
employees is the weak link (Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Use of computing systems for 
other than company business is a gateway to other potentially malevolent behaviors 
(Trinkle et al., 2014). These actions include a range of activity from simple surfing, 
online social media visits, and ultimately fraud and cybercrime activities, all of which are 
detrimental to the organization and against established information security policy 
(Trinkle et al., 2014; Vance et al., 2015).  
Additional studies investigating employees who violated information security 
policies found most managers and senior executives are personally aware of someone 
who has committed sabotage (Hafer & Gresham, 2012). One in five respondents reported 
having been a victim, at least one-half know employees who have been victimized, and 
one-third has personal knowledge of managers and customers who have been victimized. 
A key finding is that one of the purposes of information sabotage is to commit fraud of 
various types for personal gain (Hafer & Gresham, 2012).  
General Deterrence Theory (GDT) 
We selected General Deterrence Theory (Bridges & Stone, 1986; Maxwell & 
Gray, 2000) as the theoretical framework for the proposed model and hypotheses. 
General Deterrence Theory posits that sanctions, disincentives and the threat of 
punishments or sanctions serve to discourage would-be violators from engaging in 
prohibited behavior and supports policy compliance among employees. The perceived 





punishment increases, while the level of prohibited activity declines in a corresponding 
manner (Straub & Welke, 1998). Internal controls, including policy enforcement, serve to 
deter unethical behavior, and stronger controls correspondingly reduce the incidence of 
fraud (Board, 2002; Liu et al., 2015).  
 General deterrence theory serves to explain and predict individual decisions 
between compliance and non-compliance with established rules, policy, and law based on 
perceived sanctions or penalties for non-compliance (Bridges & Stone, 1986; Maxwell & 
Gray, 2000). Individuals make choices based on their internal assessment regarding the 
potential benefits and costs of their decisions, and the perceived severity and certainty of 
sanctions may influence individuals in their decisions to comply with security policies 
(Bridges & Stone, 1986; Cheng, Li, Li, Holm, & Zhai, 2013). Deterrence has predictive 
ability for specific behaviors of criminal activity (Bridges & Stone, 1986), has been 
successfully extended to the field of information systems (Chen et al., 2012; Nance & 
Straub, 1988), serves as a potent deterrent to potential information security policy 
violators, and leads to a significant decrease in violations (Straub Jr & Nance, 1990).   
Past research was conducted to determine the effect that a threat of punishment or 
sanctions has on the intended future behavior of individuals in various social, 
organizational, business and contextual environments (Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody, & 
Polak, 2015; Bridges & Stone, 1986; Erickson, Gibbs, & Jensen, 1977; Maxwell & Gray, 
2000). Deterrence theory posits that sanctions, disincentives and the threat of 
punishments or sanctions serve to discourage would-be violators from engaging in 





of certainty of being caught and severity of the sanction or punishment increases, the 
level of prohibited activity declines in a corresponding manner.   
A key determinant of deterrence effectiveness is clear and efficient 
communication of the potential sanctions for violations and rewards for compliance, 
including multiple clearly articulated statements, and follow-up regarding penalties for 
violators (Chen et al., 2012; Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010; Straub Jr & Nance, 1990). 
Sanctions include various forms of penalties that the organization imposes on an 
employee for noncompliance with the established information security policy. These may 
range from a simple verbal warning to job termination and prosecution under criminal 
statutes (Bulgurcu et al., 2010b).   
The insider threat continues to be one of the most significant threats to 
organizations (Tsohou et al., 2015; Vance et al., 2013; Willison & Siponen, 2009). 
Recent studies extended the deterrence theory to investigate whether perceived certainty 
and severity of organizational sanctions were affected by user awareness of information 
security countermeasures. Computer users were found to be aware of security policies 
through training programs and first-hand observation of computer misuse. Also the 
perceived severity of sanctions was found to be more effective in reducing information 
systems misuse than actual sanctions (D'Arcy et al., 2009). 
Deterrence theory is especially applicable to information systems since 50-75% of 
all security incidents originate from within the organization by employees and other 
trusted agents having the access and ability to detect and carry out fraudulent activities 
(D'Arcy et al., 2009). Studies are consistent in finding that a majority of the potential 





actually steal company data and use it for other than official purposes (Q. Hu, Dinev, 
Hart, & Cooke, 2012). Early studies indicated that the presumptive certainty of the 
punishment or sanction by the individual was more effective in deterring undesirable 
behavior than was the severity (Erickson et al., 1977).   
 Additional research extended deterrence theory to investigate the effects of 
perceived certainty and severity of organizational sanctions on user awareness of 
information systems security countermeasures. They found that computer users were 
aware of security policies through training programs and observation of computer misuse, 
and that the perceived severity of sanctions was more effective in reducing information 
systems misuse than actual sanctions (D'Arcy et al., 2009). 
 Since the top three most important contributing factors to fraud are lack of 
internal controls, lack of management review and override of existing internal controls, 
the human aspect must be considered. However, most academic and practitioner focus 
has been on technical controls and financial ratios. The aim of this study is to explore the 
variables the impact the human aspect more, i.e., policy quality and enforcement 
activities (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2016; Sommestad et al., 2014). 
Research Model and Hypotheses 
Figure 1 contains the proposed theoretical conceptual research model. Using the 
theoretical framework of General Deterrence Theory, we will examine how information 
security policy compliance mediates organizational fraud levels in a sampling of 






Four hypotheses will be tested. Table 3 contains the proposed theoretical 
constructs and definitions. 
Table 3 







The level of supervisory oversight, monitoring and organizational 







The perceived level of adequacy and completeness of the 
guidelines that cover all information risk possibilities in an 







The degree to which employees actually adhere to rules set forth 
in the specific policy established by the company. 
  
Fraud Some deceitful practice or willful device resorted to with intent to 
deprive another of his right, or in some manner to do him an 
injury. As distinguished from negligence, it is always positive and 




One of the two main information security issues that businesses must focus on is the 
protection of data, including proprietary information, employee information, marketing 
plans, trade secrets, etc. (Dort & Criss). Employee abuse of computers and information 
systems represents up to 75 percent of security incidents, thereby resulting in significant 
loss to organizations through fraud and other malicious activities (D'Arcy et al., 2009). 
Computer abuse includes employee noncompliance with computer security policies, and 





organizational information security policies (Trinkle et al., 2014; Warkentin & Willison, 
2009). 
Figure 1 













Quality security monitoring, as one element of strong enforcement, creates an 
environment where employees perceive they cannot be successful in fraudulent activities. 
Previous research established that organizational controls (policies and monitoring) 
increase the level of compliance and reduce the incidence of employee deviance, of 
which fraud is a key component (Dorminey et al., 2012; Hollinger & Clark, 1982).  
Information technology is a powerful tool for monitoring and recording 



























daily employee behavior to established standards by monitoring policy compliance 
increases accountability and identifiability among employees. When employees perceive 
their activities are recorded, a strong deterrence effect is created, thereby supporting a 
reduction in antisocial behaviors (Vance et al., 2013). For example, if an employee 
violates policy to access a customer database outside of their authority, the action would 
be logged and quickly traced back to the potential fraudster. Monitoring and logging are 
powerful deterrence tools and research supports their reduction in policy violations 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010b).   
Policies must be adequately enforced and continuously checked for compliance in 
order to accomplish intended objectives (Kaplan et al., 2015). Siponen and Vance (2010) 
found that neutralization is a valid and reliable predictor of individual employee 
compliance decisions regarding security policies. They conclude that neutralization 
significantly and positively affects employee intention to violate information security 
policies. Neutralization enables otherwise conscientious and exacting employees to 
rationalize and justify violating organizational security policies, which may compromise 
information and damage the company (M. Siponen & Vance, 2010).  
Higher information systems security policy quality positively affects end-user 
compliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010b; Goo et al., 2014). When employees feel that 
significant effort and resources are invested in a security policy, its relevance and 
enforcement are heightened (Abedin et al., 2006; Bulgurcu et al., 2010b). Internal 
controls, including continuous monitoring and auditing tools provide strong deterrence 
and enhance detection of potential fraud perpetrators (Dorminey et al., 2012). 





opportunities, which accounts for a large percentage of organizational fraud activity (Safa 
& Maple, 2016). Policy enforcement includes employee understanding of the penalties 
for noncompliance, including their certainty, celerity, and severity. Greater emphasis on 
these penalties by supervisors, role models, and peers results in a positive, significant 
increase in compliance by organizational users (D'Arcy et al., 2009).  
Trusted insider employees accumulate access privileges for proprietary databases 
as their longevity and seniority increases during their tenure. Due to their trusted position 
and access to increasingly sensitive organizational information, they are often in positions 
to take advantage of systems and processes to commit fraud (B. W. Carpenter & 
Mahoney, 2001; Posey et al., 2013). For example, a senior long-term employee who 
perceives weak internal controls or lack of oversight may recognize the void in 
accountability as a potential opportunity to engage in fraud. If the appropriate incentive 
(pressure) is present and the employee is able to rationalize their actions as reasonable, 
they may be positively influenced to perpetrate fraud. This is especially true if they 
believe the potential for discovery and punishment with sanctions (severity, celerity and 
certainty) is not significant. Therefore, H1 is proposed as:  
Higher levels of information security policy enforcement results in increased information 
security policy compliance. 
The human element continues to be the top concern among security professionals 
and top management teams, and employees are the weakest link (Tsohou et al., 2015). 
Employee failure to comply with information security policies results in the opportunity 





successfully perpetrated (Johnston et al., 2015; Lynch & Gomaa, 2003; Richardson & 
Director, 2008). 
Many potential fraud events originate with an individual’s ability to download 
sensitive information with little perceived monitoring or accountability. Quality security 
policies allow only the minimum number of highly vetted employees access to sensitive 
information based on a bona-fide job requirement and “need-to-know”. Often this first 
line of defense is enough to prevent any further progress toward fraud. Policy quality 
may offset neutralization in some employees when they perceive strong organizational 
policy is also routinely enforced (Vance et al., 2013).  
When institutional or individual pressure to comply with established policy is 
perceived as low or insignificant, employees are more likely to attempt fraud. Policy 
serves to shape employee beliefs regarding management’s dedication toward overall 
information security (Tsohou et al., 2015). Higher quality policy spells out specific 
expectations that employees must meet; deterrence and the threat of sanctions forces 
conformance to these requirements and specifications (Crosby, 1979). When effectively 
deployed, quality information security policies prohibit the unauthorized download of 
sensitive and valuable proprietary information, including company trade secrets and 
intellectual property.  
Therefore, H2 is proposed as:  
Higher levels of information security policy quality increases information security policy 
compliance.    
The strongest and most consistent predictor of actual information security policy 





is established through several variables. These include having a well-established, quality 
standard for employees to compare with their daily actions and perceived benefits or 
sanctions for compliance or non-compliance (deterrence effect).  
Consistent with our other hypotheses that increased security policy quality and 
enforcement individually result in increased compliance, we expect a greater effect when 
testing the interaction between higher (lower) levels of policy quality and strong (weak) 
enforcement of the policy. Research findings support that policy quality and enforcement 
are significant factors in achieving information security policy compliance within 
organizations (Goo et al., 2014; Tsohou et al., 2015). We hypothesize a significant effect 
when the constructs of security policy quality and policy enforcement are implemented 
simultaneously. This synergistic effect is consistent with previous studies where these 
constructs explained significant variance when individually tested (Sommestad et al., 
2014).  
General Deterrence Theory suggests that sanctions, disincentives and the threat of 
various punishments (sanctions) will discourage potential fraudsters from attempting 
prohibited behavior, thereby supporting policy compliance among employees (Straub & 
Welke, 1998). When employees feel their supervisors and leadership place a strong 
emphasis on security and lead by example, they are more likely to comply. When 
supervisors include elements of security in employee performance appraisals, compliance 
is increased (Goo et al., 2014).    
Therefore, H3 is proposed as:  
Higher levels of information security policy quality combined with effective enforcement 





Incentives, opportunity, and rationalization are antecedents that increase the 
potential for fraud (Accountants, 2002; Cressey, 1950, 1953). Noncompliance weakness 
is a leading predictor of detrimental incidents, including fraud (Steinbart et al., 2015). 
Based on current literature, we propose that information security compliance decreases 
individual opportunity and rationalization, thereby resulting in corresponding decreases 
in organizational fraud (Otero, 2015).  
Computer abuse includes employee noncompliance with computer security 
policies; fraud could be substantially reduced if employees would adhere to 
organizational information security policies (Trinkle et al., 2014; Warkentin & Willison, 
2009). This “insider threat” is so pervasive that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
announced implementation of a new regulation specifically to address the problem. The 
policy requires organizations doing business with DoD to develop and implement 
individual programs to detect, deter and mitigate potential insider threats (Tadjdeh, 
2016).   
A culture of compliance may develop when employees feel that understanding 
and following established policy is desirable. Past research indicates that information 
security policy design and implementation are important, and that poor quality results in 
more security breaches (D'Arcy et al., 2014; Whitman, 2003). The American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) clarified auditing standards in AU-C 240 in order 
to improve auditor effectiveness by enabling them to better identify potential fraud based 
on the Fraud Triangle. Many of the standards in AU-C 240 specifically address 





enforcement reduces reported organizational fraud levels (Cressey, 1953; Roden et al., 
2016).  
Information security internal controls serve to limit and reduce the incidence of 
unethical behavior in organizations predicted by the Fraud Triangle by increasing 
compliance (Accountants, 2002; Liu et al., 2015). Information technology controls 
consist of two categories, general and application. General controls are comprehensive 
and include restricting access, separation of duties based on need, and physical controls. 
Application controls affect later modification of IT programs (Dickins & Reisch, 2012). 
The degree of internal control compliance achieved affects the overall fraud levels 
reported (Liu et al., 2015).  
Empirical data supports the proposition that unauthorized access to data and 
subsequent file transfers offer multiple opportunities to engage in fraud (Lynch & 
Gomaa, 2003; Tabuena, 2013). Fraud perpetrators having access to valuable account 
databases often change account values in order to conceal fraud and steal from clients 
(Steinbart et al., 2015). Limiting access to information systems is one of the most basic 
forms of control instituted through security policies to protect information resources. 
Enforcing a policy effectively limiting the number of authorized users also limits the 
potential for malevolent behaviors leading to fraud. For example, an employee scheming 
to misappropriate a customer database must violate several policies in order to carry out 
the fraud. If an employee lacks basic access privileges to the database, then there is no 
fraud opportunity regardless of their incentive (pressure) and rationalization. Since 





who do not follow established policy to deviate in other areas of security enforcement 
(Dilla & Raschke, 2015; Lynch & Gomaa, 2003).  
Therefore, H4 is proposed as: Information security policy compliance is inversely 









CHAPTER 3 METHODS 
Participants 
Data was obtained from a nationwide pool using Qualtrics respondents. The first 
data set was solicited from various partners in industry whom we knew personally and 
were willing to participate. This included a wide range of business interests and 
industries. This initial data is used to perform a pilot survey and an Exploratory Factor 
Analysis (EFA) for a reliability check of the proposed instrument and to validate the 
scales (n=360) and derive a more parsimonious model. The second data set is used for the 
main study (n=400).   
Operationalization of the variables 
A 7-point Likert Survey Scale was chosen as the appropriate method because the 
focus of our study seeks individual (employee and management) attitudes and opinions 
regarding attributes of selected policy characteristics. Survey instruments will assess 
attitudes and perceptions from both the managerial and employee perspectives toward 
organizational policy quality, policy enforcement, compliance, and organizational fraud. 
Survey instruments were adapted using techniques specified by Mackenzie et al. (2011) 
and Steinbart et al., (2016) (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Podsakoff, 2011; Steinbart et al., 
2015). Constructs were developed using exacting definitions to capture key aspects of 
policy security, enforcement, compliance and organizational fraud (MacKenzie et al., 
2011). Items were selected to fully represent each information security construct to 





    
Independent Variables 
 
Information security policy quality. 
Information security policy quality is the perceived level of adequacy and 
completeness of the guidelines that cover all information risk possibilities in an 
organization (Chen et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2015; Goo et al., 2014). Policy quality is a 
function of how complete and adequate the policy serves to cover all potential risk 
situations in the organization (Bulgurcu et al., 2010b; Crosby, 1979). For example, high 
quality policies require written, mandatory guidelines regarding acceptable parameters 
for use of organizational computer resources.  
The information security policy quality construct measures the extent to which 
employees perceive that their company’s information security policy is comprehensive, 
effective, protects sensitive information from disclosure, and protects employees and the 
company from liability due to compromise. Twelve items were adapted from Chen, 
Ramamurthy & Wen (2015). Each item will be measured on a 7-point Likert scale: 
1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree.  
Information security policy enforcement. 
The enforcement construct measures the extent to which employees perceive that 
employees are aware of, trained to standard, and comply with various rules set forth in 
the specific policy on a continuous basis. Seven items were adapted from Bulgurcu 
(2010) to represent the construct). Each item will be measured on a 7-point Likert scale: 
1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree. 





Information security policy compliance consists of employee perceptions of the 
degree to which employees actually conform with and abide by the established 
organizational security policies. Seven items were initially adapted from Herath and Rao 
(2010) to represent the construct. Each item will be measured on a 7-point Likert scale: 
1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree. 
Dependent Variable – Organizational Fraud 
 
The dependent variable is organizational fraud, which we define here from 
Black’s Law Dictionary as “some deceitful practice or willful device, resorted to with 
intent to deprive another of his right, or in some manner to do him an injury. As 
distinguished from negligence, it is always positive, intentional” (Bryan, 2009). 
Organizational frauds are generally classified into three primary categories: asset 
misappropriations, corruption and financial statement fraud (ACFE, 2016).  
The fraud construct measures the extent to which employees perceive that fraud is 
possible in their company because of violations of organizational information security 
policies (lack of compliance). Five items were adapted from Lynch and Gomaa (2003), 
who performed studies of information technology and its impact on employee behavioral 
attitudes in predicting computer fraud. Each item will be measured on a 7-point Likert 
scale: 1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree. 
Analysis 
To analyze the data, we performed Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression to 
determine if employee perceptions of quality and enforcement are main effects and to 
determine the extent of their interaction. OLS regression was selected since it minimizes 





dependent variable (JFJ Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). We found significant 
synergy and interaction effects between policy quality and enforcement as hypothesized. 
Baker and Wallace (2015) found significant positive correlations between security policy 
implementation, including enforcement, and lower violation outcomes. They also found 
that organizations reporting higher quality and levels of technical control were more 
likely to experience incidents than those with high scores across all three types of 
controls. This study also supports that an incomplete security program, i.e., less 
enforcement, is less effective than a more comprehensive program (Baker & Wallace, 
2007). We are also testing to see if there is full or partial mediation between the 













CHAPTER 4 RESULTS 
      
 This chapter will provide data analysis and findings from the empirical study. 
First, we discuss the pilot study and associated Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). Next, 
we evaluate the data for assumptions required for Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression. We then test each hypothesis using OLS regression and analyze the model for 
potential partial or full mediation. Finally, we provide findings and results for each of the 
hypotheses tested.  
Issues with the Survey Method 
 White noise and other potential issues have been discussed in the literature 
regarding the use of online surveys to collect data (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001; 
Hunter, 2012; Ravallion & Chen, 1997). Cognitive measurement error and “White Noise 
Error” may be associated with survey questions that potentially affect the validity of 
survey questions and ultimately the research’s outcome. Our Pilot Survey was designed 
to assess and minimize the effects of white noise within our survey and the results. 
Pilot Study and Data Collection 
A pilot study was conducted prior to the main study using data from 360 
respondents. The number of respondents chosen for the pilot study is based on the 
minimum number of factor loadings needed for significance, in this case 350 (assuming a 
minimum factor loading of 0.30). The pilot study was included to reduce measurement 
error by validating the selected instrument’s effectiveness and the value of questions to 





(JFJ Hair et al., 2010). Any problems identified with the instrumentation or 
elements of the data collection technique were corrected prior to the main study. All 
respondents were employed by various companies nationally. Respondents had the ability 
to choose from several categories including entry level/junior management/ supervisory, 
mid-level management, senior-level management (COO, CIO, CFO, etc.), military or 
academic as listed in Table 4. All respondents were required to use a computer as part of 
their daily duties and to have a current mandatory information security policy (ISP). The 
response rate was 63.56% for the pilot survey.  
Table 4 
 
Descriptive Statistics for the Pilot Study (N=360) 
Age  Frequency Percent 
 Valid 
Percent 
           Cumulative      
Percent 
Valid 18-30 Years 58 16.1 16.1 16.1 
31-40 Years 101 28.1 28.1 44.2 
41-50 Years 77 21.4 21.4 65.6 
50+ Years 124 34.4 34.4 100.0 
Total 360 100.0 100.0  
Sex     
Valid Male     258 71.7  71.7 71.7 
Female 102 28.3 28.3 100.0 
Total 360 100.0 100.0  
Time employed by the Company     
Valid Less than one year 51 14.2 14.2 14.2 
1-3 Years 87 24.2 24.2 38.3 
3-5 Years 60 16.7 16.7 55.0 
More than 5 years 162 45.0 45.0 100.0 
Total 360 100.0 100.0  











147 40.8 40.8 63.1 
Senior-Level 
Management (COO, 
CIO, CFO, etc.). 
67 18.6 18.6 81.7 
Military 13 3.6 3.6 85.3 
Academic 53 14.7 14.7 100.0 
Total 360 100.0 100.0  
 
 An Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was performed using data from the pilot 
study on the three independent variables: quality, enforcement, and compliance. A 
separate EFA was run using the dependent variable (fraud) alone. The purpose was to 
examine the relationships among the variables and to identify the factors with common 
patterns in order to reduce the number of factors to the minimum number that will 
explain the most variance (JFJ Hair et al., 2010; JF Hair, Money, Samouel, & Page, 
2011).  
 The EFA included the original 26 independent variables using Principal 
Components Analysis with Varimax rotation and Kaiser Normalization (JFJ Hair et al., 
2010). Factors with eigenvalues of 1.0 and above were selected from the total variance 
explained. This initial solution included several variables that had more than one 
significant loading, i.e., loading on more than one component (PQ8, PQ9, PQ10, PQ11, 
PQ12). An intermediate step of factor analysis is to reduce or eliminate the significant 
cross-loadings so that only one significant loading remains for each row of the factor 
matrix (JFJ Hair et al., 2010). These cross-loading variables were removed from the 
initial list since they had dual loadings exceeding the threshold of 0.40. The threshold of 





structure interpretation. Loadings of 0.50 and above are practically significant; and 
loadings exceeding 0.70 are considered to represent a well-defined structure (JFJ Hair et 
al., 2010). The next iteration was run after removal of the five significant cross-loading 
variables. The next iteration resulted in removal of two more cross-loading variables 
(PQ5, PQ7). The final run resulted in removal of PQ4 and PQ6, which were the final 
remaining variables cross-loading at a significant level (0.40 and above). None of the 
remaining independent variables cross-loaded at a significant level and were retained. 
This resulted in 17 of the original 26 independent variables used for our regression as 
listed below in Table 5.  
Table 5 

















E1 0.58 0.27 0.03 n/a 
E2 0.66 0.32 -0.04 n/a 
E3 0.81 0.25 -0.04 n/a 
E4 0.80 0.21 -0.07 n/a 
E5 0.79 0.24 0.03 n/a 
E6 0.92 -0.04 0.02 n/a 
E7 0.92 0.04 0.05 n/a 
*Policy 
Quality (PQ) 
PQ1 0.32 0.79 0.14 n/a 
PQ2 0.22 0.86 -0.03 n/a 








C1 0.23 0.01 0.81 n/a 
C2 9.17 0.02 0.80 n/a 
C3 0.12 0.01 0.84 n/a 
C4 0.12 -0.01 0.89 n/a 








0.23 0.11 0.84 n/a 
**FRAUD 
F1 n/a n/a n/a 0.69 
F2 n/a n/a n/a 0.81 
F3 n/a n/a n/a 0.80 




n/a n/a n/a -0.40 
*First EFA using independent variables 
**Second EFA using dependent variable, no Varimax rotation 
***Three items were reverse-coded  
These remaining variables were then used to compute new summated score variables for 
each construct. These newly computed variables were then used for OLS regression to 
test each of the hypotheses. Summated score variables are used to help reduce 
measurement error and to achieve parsimony with the number of variables in the model 





 After analysis of the scales, three variables (C6, C7 & F5) were identified for 
reverse coding. This was performed due to the variables being negatively coded, i.e., 
lower values indicated higher agreement or more positive sentiments (Krosnick, 1999).   
 A second EFA was performed to analyze the dependent variable (fraud). This was 
performed separately since it is inappropriate to mix independent and dependent variables 
in a single EFA and subsequently use the derived factors to support dependence 
relationships (JF Hair et al., 2011). Since there was only one dependent variable, the 





 Collection and Analysis  
 As in the pilot study, all respondents were employed by various companies 
nationally. Respondents had the ability to choose from several categories including entry 
level/junior management/ supervisory, mid-level management, senior-level management 
(COO, CIO, CFO, etc.), military or academic as listed in Table 6. All respondents were 
Table 6 
 
Descriptive Statistics (N=400)      
Age              Frequency 




    Cumulative     
Percent 
 
Valid 18-30 Years                             104            26.0  26.0       26.0 
31-40 Years                             146            36.5  36.5  62.5 
41-50 Years                               76            19.0  19.0  81.5 
50+ Years                                  74            18.5  18.5   100.0 
Total                                         400  100.0     100.0 
Sex      
Valid Male                                         200            50.0  50.0  50.0 
Female                                      200           50.0  50.0    100.0 
Total                                         400  100.0     100.0 
Time Employed                                  
Valid  Less than one year                    40              10.0      10.0                    10.0   
1-3 Years                                  81              20.3                 20.3                      30.3  
3-5 Years                                  85              21.3                                  21.3       51.3  
More than 5 years                   194              48.7                    48.7                          100.0  
Total                                        400   100.0  
Current Job Position     
Valid Entry-Level/Junior                 149              37.3 
management or supervisory 
 
              37.3  37.3 
Mid-Level Management         160             40.0   40.0   77.3 
Senior-Level Management       56             14.0 
(COO, CIO, CFO, etc.). 
  14.0   91.3 
Military                                      2                5.0    .5  91.8 
Academic                                  33               8.3   8.3   100.0 





required to use a computer as part of their daily duties and to have a current mandatory 
information security policy (ISP). 400 respondents answered the survey questions 
completely, with a response rate of 77.57%. 
 A test of internal consistency reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) was performed with 
each of the factors separately. This is to determine whether the items in each scale 
combined into a single index captures in a consistent manner the respective constructs 
being measured. The results are reflected below in Table 7. Cronbach’s Alpha should be 
at least 0.70 (0.60 acceptable for exploratory). The overall Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.82 





Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
*0.82 0.83 22 
*0.60 acceptable for exploratory research, 0.70 otherwise. 
 
 The KMO statistic measures sampling adequacy overall and for each individual 
variable (Kaiser 1970; Cerny and Kaiser 1977; Dziuban & Shirkey, 1974). KMO values 
greater than 0.8 are considered good and less than 0.5 must be remediated, possibly by 
removing the values. Since the overall measure is 0.95, the sample is considered adequate 
and statistically significant (p = 0.05). Each of the individual Measures of Sampling 
Adequacy (MSA) produced on the Anti-Image Matrices (Appendix) range from 0.68 to 










KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
0.95 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 




Evaluation for Assumptions of Regression Analysis 
 We evaluated the regression model for assumptions of linearity, 
homoscedasticity, independence of the residuals, and normality (JFJ Hair et al., 2010). 
First, we performed Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances with the results 
indicated in Table 9 and found no significant difference in the error variance across 
groups (0.67, p = 0.05).  
Table 9 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances 
Dependent Variable:   FRAUD   
F df1 df2           p            Sig. 
0.90 379 20           0.05 0.67 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across 
groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + QUALITY + ENFORCEMENT + COMPLIANCE 
 
 We then performed an initial check for normality of the error term of the variate 
by visually examining the normal probability plots of the residuals. The values fall 
generally along the diagonal line with no substantial or significant departures, meaning 
that the residuals may represent a normal distribution and the variate meets the 





normal Q-Q plots, and box plots demonstrated that the data were approximately normally 
distributed. In Table 10 we analyzed the standardized residuals for kurtosis and skewness. 
The z-values were computed by dividing the skewness and kurtosis statistic by the 
standard error, resulting in z = -1.139 for skewness and z = 1.687, respectively (Cramer 
& Howitt, 2004; Doane & Seward, 2011). Both of the computed z-values fall within the 
range of -1.96 to 1.96. Based on these results, our data does not differ significantly from 
normality. From this we conclude that our data are approximately normally distributed in 
terms of skewness and kurtosis.  
Table 10 






95% Confidence  












 5% Trimmed Mean  0.00  
 Median  0.00  
 Variance  0.69  
 Std. Deviation  0.84  
 Minimum  -3.15  
 Maximum  2.24  
 Range  5.38  
 Interquartile Range  0.96  
 *Skewness  -0.14 0.12 
 *Kurtosis  0.41 0.24 
 Kurtosis z-score  -1.14  
 Skewness z-score  1.69  
*Values within -1.96 to 1.96 support conclusion of normally distributed data 
Table 11 lists the Cronbach’s Alpha, composite reliability (where provided) and Average 
Variance Extracted (AVE) for instruments used in past research. Although our values are 





limits for our research. The fraud construct has not been used as extensively so no data 
was given for reliability in previous research.  
Table 11  
 
Cronbach’s Alpha, CFR and AVE for Constructs 
   
    
Construct Definition Cronbach’s 
Alpha                                                                                                                                                                          






The level of supervisory 
oversight, monitoring and 
organizational emphasis placed 
on information security 
(Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & 











The perceived level of adequacy 
and completeness of the 
guidelines that cover all 
information risk possibilities in 
an organization (Chen 





  0.80 
 







The degree to which employees 
actually adhere to rules set forth 
in the specific policy established 







      0.87            0.88 
     
Fraud Some deceitful practice or 
willful device resorted to with 
intent to deprive another of his 
right, or in some manner to do 
him an injury. As distinguished 
from negligence, it is always 
positive, intentional (Black’s 
Law Dictionary, 2016; Lynch & 
Gomaa, 2003). 








The initial regression model was stated as: Predicted compliance Y = bo + v1 + v2 + v3 + e 
Where: 
bo = constant rate of compliance. 
v1 = change in compliance associated with change in policy enforcement 
v2 = change in compliance associated with change in policy quality 
V3 = (v1*v2) change in compliance associated with interaction of quality and enforcement 
e = Prediction error (residual) 
 A simple linear regression was run to evaluate if the enforcement construct 
predicts compliance, B = 0.73, p = 0.05, (Table 12). A significant regression equation 
was found, F (1, 398) = 290.75, p = 0.05 with an adjusted R2 of 0.53. The model indicates 
a statistically significant relationship between the independent variable (policy 
enforcement) and compliance (p = 0.05). The Pearson Correlation (Table 12) is 0.74, 
indicating a significant correlation between enforcement and compliance. Policy 
enforcement is a significant predictor of compliance. This supports our first hypothesis 
(H1) that higher levels of information security policy enforcement results in increased 
information security policy compliance.  
 Next, a simple linear regression was run to evaluate if the quality construct 
predicts compliance, B = 0.55, p = 0.05, (Table 12). A significant regression equation 
was found, F (1, 398) = 114.09, p = 0.05 with an adjusted R2 of 0.30. The model indicates 
a statistically significant relationship between the independent variable (policy quality) 
and compliance (p = 0.05). The Pearson Correlation (Table 12) is 0.54, indicating a 
significant correlation between quality and compliance. Policy quality is a significant 





information security policy quality results in increased information security policy 
compliance.  
 Next, a simple linear regression was run to evaluate the relationship and potential 
significant interaction effect between quality and enforcement on compliance, B = 0.71, p 
= 0.05, (Table 12). A significant regression equation was found, F (1, 398) = 265.41, p = 
0.05 with an adjusted R2 of 0.51. The model indicates a statistically significant 
relationship between the independent variable (interaction effect between policy quality 
and enforcement) and compliance (p = 0.05). This interaction effect is a significant 
predictor of compliance. This supports our third hypothesis (H3) that higher levels of 
information security policy quality combined with increased enforcement results in 
increased information security policy compliance.  
 A simple linear regression was run to evaluate if the compliance construct 
predicts fraud, B = -0.61, p = 0.05, (Table 12). A significant regression equation was 
found, F (1, 398) = 27.36, p = 0.05 with an adjusted R2 of 0.28 The model indicates a 
statistically significant negative relationship between the independent variable 
(compliance) and fraud, p = 0.05. The Pearson Correlation (Table 12) is -0.530, 
indicating a significant negative correlation between compliance and fraud. Therefore, 
our fourth hypothesis (H4) that higher levels of information security policy compliance 
















     
Coefficient 
      Std. 
Error 
    t-
stat 






ENF-COMP  0.73 0.05 17.05 0.00 0.53 290.75 
QUAL-COMP 0.55 0.05 10.68 0.00 0.30 114.09 
INTERACT_QUAL_ENF 0.71 0.01 16.29 0.00 0.51 265.41 
COMP-FRAUD -0.61 0.443 -6.739 0.00 0.28 27.36 











A summary of regression results and hypotheses is contained in Table 14. H1, H2 and H3 
and H4 were supported. Full mediation was also supported.  
 
Correlation Matrix  
 FRAUD COMP ENF QUAL 
Pearson Correlation FRAUD 1.00 -0.53 -0.36 -0.23 
COMP -0.53 1.00 0.74 0.54 
ENF -0.36 0.74 1.00 0.56 
QUAL -0.23 0.54 0.56 1.00 
Sig. (1-tailed) FRAUD_ . 0.00 0.00 0.00 
COMP 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 
ENF 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 






Table 14  
 
Summary of Regression Results 
   
    




H1 Higher levels of information 
security policy enforcement results 
in increased information security 
policy compliance. 
 
Supported   
H2 Higher levels of information 
security policy quality increases 
information security policy 





   
 
       
H3 Higher levels of information 
security policy quality combined 
with effective enforcement 
increases information security 






      
     
H4 Information security policy 
compliance is inversely related to 
reported organizational fraud. 
Supported        
 
Mediation Full Mediation      Supported  
   


















DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND CONTRIBUTION 
 This chapter begins with a discussion of the limitations we experienced in 
conducting our research. We then discuss both the academic and practitioner 
contributions derived from the research and how it may be used in industry. Next, we 
discuss future potential research related to information security policy characteristics. 
Finally, we finish with our conclusions from the research.  
Limitations 
 Empirical data has historically been difficult to obtain in fraud research as 
respondents are consistently hesitant to report based on fears of compromise and 
attribution (Moody, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2018). We experienced this phenomenon to be 
true in our study. However, we were able to somewhat overcome this problem using 
Qualtrics survey data, which provided an anonymous platform to gather information from 
respondents who are currently in the workforce. This anonymity served to assuage the 
respondents inherent fear of attribution, traceability and perceived ramifications 
potentially resulting from participating in our survey.  
 We discovered some potential shortcoming of using this anonymous data. Among 
these were the lack of face-to-face interaction with potential respondents and the ability 
to glean additional insights beyond the scope of the designed study. For example, face-to-
face contact using open-ended questions would allow respondents to volunteer additional 





our initial pilot test of the survey instruments, we were able to validate the instruments 
and then obtain sufficient data to complete the study. Also, we were not able to analyze 
and compare the different levels of information security policy quality by actually 
viewing and rating various organizational policies as we had originally planned.  
 Another potential limitation is the respondents’ lack of vesting and accountability 
for the outcomes obtained as a result of the answers provided. Since we could not capture 
specific relationships between the respondents’ answer and specific organizations, the 
data has less overall meaning than if we could pair the results with specific companies, 
their level of supervisory and managerial security competence, and other variables.   
Academic Contribution 
 There is a shortage of articles related to fraud examination especially as it relates 
to information systems (Brody, Melendy, & Perri, 2012; G. M. Trompeter et al., 2014). 
Originally, we set out to provide a unique contribution to the field of fraud study by 
examining an innovative and unprecedented insight into how the many characteristics of 
information security policy influences organizational fraud. Our contribution is a modest 
beginning to exploring additional ways of solving the growing fraud problem in 
organizations.  
 A significant finding of this research is that policy compliance reduces 
organizational fraud. We also found that compliance fully mediates between the 
independent variables of policy quality and enforcement with fraud. This has practical 
relevance indicating that more research is needed to determine potential links between 
fraud and other information security policy characteristics, such as more focus on specific 





on specific business units may serve to provide the differentiation need to identify and 
track potential abuses. This is also consistent with past research that the most significant 
threat from fraud and systems compromise is carried out by trusted insiders (Bulgurcu, 
Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010a).   
Practitioner Contribution 
 Potential solutions to fraud are increasingly valuable to boards, management, and 
organizations, both for-profit and not-for-profit. Empirical data is consistent in finding 
that trusted individuals within the organization are the most likely to violate existing 
policies and engage in fraudulent activity. The trusted insider is more significant than any 
known external threats. Focus on the human element within organizations continues to be 
a top priority and finding improved solutions to the insider threat may be enhanced by 
closer examination of information security policy characteristics combined with other 
analytical tools.  
 Our research could provide significant insight into compliance with the new 
General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) by examination in further detail those 
aspects of security policy characteristics identified (Desai, 2013; Diker Vanberg & 
Maunick, 2018; Tikkinen-Piri, Rohunen, & Markkula, 2017). Our research indicates that 
the human element is very important in reducing malicious activities by trusted insiders. 
The GDPR is “common sense” data security which is directed at controlling the insider 
threat. It minimizes collection of private personal data and requires that personal data no 
longer needed must be deleted. It also restricts data access through enforcement of 
policies, procedures, and processes. Unlike many other security programs, GDPR targets 





to all organizations storing and/or processing EU resident’s personal data, regardless of 
the geographic location. Many organizations are unaware that the EU GDPR regulation 
apply globally. The impact to businesses is comprehensive and will permanently change 
the way customer data is collected, stored, and used. Organizations offering goods or 
services to EU residents must comply with GDPR requirements. There are many 
mandatory policy compliance features in the regulation where our research could be 
applied, including opt-in consent, data storage and transfer, and many others. 
Theoretical Contribution 
Our study contributes to General Deterrence Theory (Bridges & Stone, 1986; 
Maxwell & Gray, 2000) by supporting the premise that sanctions, disincentives and the 
threat of punishment and/or sanctions serve to discourage potential violators from 
performing prohibited behavior. Our research supports that the perceived probability of 
discovery coupled with the severity of the potential advertised sanctions or punishment 
increases compliance, while the level of prohibited activity declines in a corresponding 
manner as posited by Straub (Straub & Welke, 1998). Stronger internal controls, better 
quality policies and more robust policy enforcement serves to deter unethical behavior. 
Stronger controls may correspondingly reduce the incidence of fraud, especially with 
enhanced internal monitoring of trusted employees.  
Future Research 
 Our research opens the door to other potential behavioral research areas that are 
just beginning to be explored. For example, information security policy characteristics 
could be examined in the context of solo versus collusive frauds and the degree to which 





activities (Bishop, Hermanson, & Riley Jr, 2017). Research that studies specific 
behaviors of employees when they have greater input into the design and implementation 
of information security policy would also be a possibility.  
Conclusion 
 As a result of this research, we can conclude that there are significant 
relationships between certain information security policy characteristics and the degree to 
which they are enforced. Enforcement may be enhanced if policies are more 
comprehensive and tailored to the specific duty or function of the employee. The 
synergistic effect of higher quality policies coupled with increased enforcement may 
enhance overall compliance. Potential links between compliance and organizational fraud 
still warrants further study.  
 The just-released AFCE Report to the Nations indicates that fraud is continuing to 
increase globally, both in scope and scale. As such, it is imperative that academia, 
government and business exhaust all efforts to glean effective deterrents and solutions to 
the problem. Our research is a significant first-step to analyze these relationships since 
they have not been studied significantly in the past. Gauging from the interest generated 
from our research, we are confident that this will open up further opportunities to explore 
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* Denotes survey questions used as a result of Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). 
 
Fraud Survey - Qualtrics Respondents 
Are you currently working full time?  Yes or No. 
Skip To: End of Block If Working = No 
 
Do you use a computer for work? Yes or No. 
Skip To: End of Block If Work = No 
 
Please complete the following demographic questions. This is very important for us to be 
able to draw conclusions from the data. Answering these questions will not link your 
answer to any individual data.  
 Sex: Male or Female.  
 Time employed by the company:  
Less than one year   
1-3 Years   
3-5 Years   
More than 5 years   
 







 My current age as of today is: 
18-30 Years  
31-40 Years   
41-50 Years    
50+ Years    
 
 My current job position is classified as: 
Entry-Level/Junior management or supervisory   
Mid-Level Management   
Senior-Level Management (COO, CIO, CFO, etc.).   
Military   
Academic    
 
 
 KSU IRB Study #18-021: INVESTIGATING INFORMATION SECURITY 
POLICY CHARACTERISTICS: DO QUALITY, ENFORCEMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE REDUCE ORGANIZATIONAL FRAUD?      Thank you very 
much for assisting with this research!       
Title of Research Study: Investigating information security policy characteristics: Do 
quality, enforcement, and compliance reduce organizational fraud?       
Researcher's Contact Information:  Name, Telephone, and Email.  Dennis Brown, 
678-557-9844. DBrown3@kennesaw.edu.       
Introduction: You are being invited to take part in a research study conducted by Dennis 
Brown of Kennesaw State University.  Before you decide to participate in this study, you 
should read this form and ask questions about anything that you do not understand. This 
is an academic study for purposes of partial fulfillment of requirements for the Doctorate 
of Business Administration (DBA) at Kennesaw State University.       
Description of Project 
  





security policy quality and enforcement on policy compliance. Ultimately, we hope to 
determine potential impacts of policy compliance on organizational fraud.        
Explanation of Procedures 
  
   You will be asked to complete online a series of questions relating to your job position. 
Please answer each question honestly and to the best of your ability. It is important to 
answer all questions, but you may stop answering at any time.       
Time Required 
  
The entire questionnaire should take no longer than 20 minutes to complete.       
Risks or Discomforts: There are no known risks or anticipated discomforts in this 
study.       
Benefits: Although there are no direct benefits to you for answering the survey questions, 
you may learn more about yourself and about the topic of fraud and information security 
policies. Your responses will also help further research in this important and emerging 
field.       
Compensation: Compensation will be offered via your panel membership. 
 
Confidentiality: The results of this participation will be anonymous. Data will not be 
linked to any individual initially or at any stage of the survey. All data will be aggregated 
and statistically tested for overall results. IP addresses will not be collected at any time.       
 
Inclusion Criteria for Participation: You must be 18 years of age or older to participate 
in this study.        
 
Use of Online Survey: IP addresses will NOT be collected. Since there is no need to 
correlate individual responses with aggregate data, participant responses will be 
anonymous and not linked to any individual.      Research at Kennesaw State University 
that involves human participants is carried out under the oversight of an Institutional 
Review Board.  Questions or problems regarding these activities should be addressed to 
the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 585 Cobb Avenue, KH3403, 
Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, (470) 578-2268 or via e-mail at 





FOR YOUR RECORDS, OR IF YOU DO NOT HAVE PRINT CAPABILITIES, YOU 
MAY CONTACT THE RESEARCHER TO OBTAIN A COPY       
 
I agree and give my consent to participate in this research project. I understand that 
participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw my consent at any time without 
penalty.   
I do not agree to participate and will be excluded from the remainder of the questions.   
Considering your current position, please rate the extent that you agree or disagree with 
the following statements below?       
Policy Quality (PQ) 
*PQ1 My company provides all employees mandatory policies regarding computer usage 
and proprietary data usage.  
*PQ2 My company's written security policy clearly states that employees should only use 
computer resources (and access data) for job-specific duties.  
*PQ3 My company's written policies clearly state what computer resources employees 
should have access to complete their job duties.  
PQ4 My company's written policies specifically forbid employees from accessing 
computer resources and data that they are not authorized to use in their job 
responsibilities.  
PQ5 My company has a clearly written information security policy that is easy to 
understand and comply with.  
PQ6 My company's Information security policy probably meets internationally 
recognized technical benchmarks.  
PQ7 My company's information security policy informs employees that all use of 
computer resources will be logged and potentially monitored.  
PQ8 My company's information security policy includes a clear and consistent definition 
of boundaries regarding proper (and improper) employee use of computing assets. 
PQ9 My company's information security policy ensures protection and security of 
sensitive company information.  
PQ10 My company's information security policy clearly sets forth disciplinary action and 





PQ11 My company's information security policy is comprehensive (covers all important 
topics of computer and data risk). 
PQ12 My company's information security policy is tailored to the different functional 
areas specific to each business unit. 
Enforcement (ENF) 
*E1 If an employee were caught violating organizational information security policies, 
they would be severely punished.  
*E2 My company's whistleblower” program is reliable and actively monitored.   
*E3 My company actively disciplines employees who break information security policies 
and rules.  
*E4 My company quickly investigates suspected information security policy infractions 
and always holds employees accountable for violations. 
 
*E5 My supervisor and management are focused on making sure that everyone follows 
established information security policies and procedures. 
 
*E6 The supervisors and leaders in my organization lead by example in information 
security policy enforcement.  
 




*C1 My company encourages all employees to lead by example to encourage compliance 
with computer/data use and Information security policies. 
*C2 All employees of my company intend to actively protect data and technology 
resources. (according to the policies) 
*C3 I perceive that all employees carry out prescribed information security policies of 
my company. 
*C4 All employees understand the importance of following prescribed information 
security policy responsibilities at work, which creates a strong culture to meet established 
standards for computer resources and Information security. 
* C5 All employees view meeting established information security policy and computer 





*C6 Employees in my company visit prohibited, non-work related sites (ESPN, 
Facebook, etc.) even though this may increase the risk to company information system 
*C7 Employees in my company play games using online social networks knowing this 
may compromise company data. 
Fraud (FRAUD) 
*F1 I am aware of employees of my company using computer resources for personal 
gain.  
*F2 Stealing valuable assets from my employer using the company’s computer system 
would be easy for a manager to accomplish. 
*F3 Engaging in fraudulent behavior using my company’s computer system would be 
something that most managers would consider. 
*F4 Managers are more likely to engage in fraudulent behavior using my company’s 
computer system if they feel their activities are anonymous. 
*F5 Most managers would never engage in fraudulent behavior using our computer 


































 Baron and Kenny (2006) posit that certain tests must be met in order for 
mediation to be supported. Mediation tests the conditions that 1) the proposed mediator is 
statistically significant with the independent variables; 2) that the proposed mediator is 
statistically significant with the dependent variable; and that 3) when the dependent 
variable is regressed on the proposed mediator and the independent variables, the 
mediator must be statistically significant. All of these conditions must be present to 
support a full mediation model (Baron & Kenny, 1986; P. J.-H. Hu, Hu, & Fang, 2017; 
Zhao, Lynch Jr, & Chen, 2010). Here we test to see if policy compliance either fully or 
partially mediates between the independent variables, (policy quality and policy 
enforcement) and the dependent variable, fraud.  
 Predicted Fraud Incidence Y = bo + b1v1 + b2v2 + b3v3 +b4v4+e 
Where: 
bo = constant rate of fraud incidence independent of policy quality, enforcement, and 
compliance. 
v1 = change in fraud incidence associated with change in policy enforcement 
v2 = change in fraud incidence associated with change in policy quality  
v3 = change in fraud incidence associated with change in policy compliance 
v4 = change in fraud incidence associated with interaction of quality and enforcement 
e = Prediction error (residual) 
We calculated an initial multiple regression of quality and enforcement on compliance, B 
= 0.61 (enforcement) and 0.22 (quality), p = 0.05, (Table 15). A significant regression 
equation was found, F (1, 398) = 165.52, p = 0.05 with adjusted R2 of 0.56. The model 
produces a statistically significant relationship between the independent variables (policy 
quality and enforcement) and the potential mediator (compliance). This satisfies the first 







Regression Results for Quality & Enforcement on Policy Compliance 
(COMP) 
 
Variable      Coefficient       Std. Error     t-stat       p-value Adj. R2 
F-
Statistic 
ENF 0.61 0.05 12.28 0.00 0.56 165.52 
QUAL 0.22 0.06 4.41 0.00 0.56 165.52 
 
 Next, we calculated a regression of fraud on the potential mediator (compliance), 
B = -0.53, p = 0.05, (Table 16). A significant regression equation was found, F (1, 398) = 
80.56, p = 0.05 with adjusted R2 of 0.28. The model produces a meaningful adjusted R2 
and a statistically significant relationship between the dependent variable (fraud) and the 
potential mediator (compliance). This satisfies the second condition to support a finding 
of mediation.  
Table 16 
 
Regression Results for Fraud and Compliance (COMP)  
Variable      Coefficient       Std. Error     t-stat       p-value Adj. R2 F-Statistic 
COMP -0.53 0.29  -8.97 0.00 0.28 80.56 
       
 
 Finally, we calculated a regression of fraud on the mediator (compliance), B = -
0.60; quality, B = 0.07; and enforcement, B = 0.05, p = 0.05, (Table 17). A significant 
regression equation was found, F (3, 396) = 27.36, p = 0.05 with adjusted R2 of 0.28. The 
model produces a meaningful adjusted R2 and a statistically significant relationship 
between the dependent variable (fraud) and the potential mediator (compliance). 
Enforcement and quality are not significant. This satisfies the third and final condition to 
support a finding of mediation. Therefore, compliance fully mediates the relationship 







Regression Results for Quality, Enforcement & Compliance (COMP)- Fraud  
Variable      Coefficient       Std. Error     t-stat       p-value Adj. R2 F-Statistic 
ENF 0.05 0.57 0.56 0.58 0.28 27.36 
QUAL 0.07 0.36 0.95 0.34 0.28 27.36 
COMP -0.60 0.44 -6.74 0.00 0.28 27.36 
 
